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I. INTRODUCTION
"There is no such thing as a level playing field."1
S EVEN YEARS ago, when the Uruguay Round of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) com-
menced, all involved parties committed to agree on rules
limiting government subsidies to industry. First proposed
in 1945, similar attempts in the past achieved only limited
success.2 Even agreement on the most fundamental issue,
the definition of a subsidy, was unresolved. The problem
was that, taken to the extreme, almost any government ex-
penditure, such as one for education or road building, may
be interpreted as a subsidy. Direct payments to industry ob-
viously qualified, but that was the extent of the consensus.
Whether unemployment programs, job training, and disas-
ter assistance qualify as subsidies remains undecided.
Subsidies have proved to be hard to limit in part because
they are so effective. Governments use them "to promote
important objectives of national policy,"3 such as stimulat-
ing infant industries, supporting ailing industries, promot-
ing exports, creating jobs, and in certain sectors, increasing
national security and national prestige.4 A related problem
is that subsidies involve sensitive governmental action only
curable through high level diplomatic negotiation.
Furthermore, subsidies are easily legislated because they
directly benefit certain groups, while their harm is spread
over all of society. The beneficiaries are readily apparent
while those hurt do not have a large enough stake in the
matter to lobby against them. Also, recipients are usually
politically popular and sympathetic groups, like farmers,
I Playing Fields; Influence of Government Subsidies on Aircraft Industry Competition, AIR
TRANSPORT WORLD, Aug. 1991, at 2.
Patrick J. McDonough, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in 1 THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HisToRY (1956-1992) 809 (Terence P. Stewart ed.,
1993).
5 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, Preamble, reprinted in
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELEc:TED DOCUMENTs 56 (Supp. 26 1980) [hereinaf-
ter Subsidies Code].
4 See McDonough, supra note 2, at 810.
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who provoke little opposition. In short, the elimination or
reduction of subsidies requires international commitment
because "the concentrated interests of producers command
greater [national] political support than the diffuse inter-
ests of consumers,"5 which results in a classic tragedy of the
commons. There is also usually less opposition than one
might expect in importing countries who benefit from
cheaper goods as a result of these subsidies, as long as no
monopolistic intent is attributed to the subsidizing
country.
6
At times, it seems that subsidies benefit everyone. One
must, however, remember the original mission of the
GATT: to increase world prosperity.' These subsidies allow
countries without a comparative advantage to produce cer-
tain products, undermining world prosperity. In short, sub-
sidization yields inefficiency, at least according to the GATT
paradigm.
In no industry has the subsidies question been more con-
tentious than in aircraft manufacturing. The traditional
American prominence in the field has been shattered by
the European Community's Airbus consortium. The
United States and the European Community have been un-
able to resolve the dispute, though they have been negotiat-
ing for over twenty years. Recently, this one industry almost
thwarted the seven years' work of the Uruguay Round. Fur-
thermore, in response to this dispute, the U.S. aircraft man-
ufacturing industry has called for Congress to accept a new
"industrial policy" which would promote direct government
involvement in industry.8
This paper traces the evolution of the GATT subsidies
rules beginning with Article XVI of the original GATT and
the 1979 Subsidies Code. Part II focuses on the American
5 Id.
6 SeJOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA.
TIONS 759 (3d ed. 1995).
Id. at 7-15.
8 Trade and Competitiveness of U.S. Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 56-59 (1992) (testimony of Lawrence Clarkson, Vice
President for Planning and International Developments, The Boeing Corp.).
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and European conception of "industrial policy," which has
largely shaped these rules, and examines the recent pres-
sure in the United States to accept industrial policy, in part
due to the influence of the aircraft manufacturing industry.
Part III focuses on the recently completed Uruguay Round
and uses the aircraft manufacturing industry's ultimate ex-
clusion from any final agreement to exhibit the difficulty of
resolving the subsidies issue. Finally, Part IV considers the
effects of excluding an industry from the GATT process and
attempts to reconcile industrial policy with the goals of sub-
sidy limitations. Throughout this analysis, the paper fo-
cuses on the bargaining positions of the United States and
the European Community, the major players in the aircraft
subsidies negotiations. This is not meant as a slight to the
other countries involved in GATT negotiations, but is sim-
ply a practical reflection of bargaining power.
II. THE ORIGINAL GATT TREATY AND
THE TOKYO ROUND
By requiring parties to report them, the original GATT
treaty, signed in 1947, acknowledged that subsidies may ad-
versely affect international trade.9 Article XVI contained a
one paragraph obligation requiring countries merely to
"notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the ex-
tent and nature of [their] subsidization," its estimated ef-
fect, and, if serious prejudice were likely to occur, to discuss
the subsidies with other concerned parties.10
In 1955, additional obligations were added to Article
XVI. 11 The result was that the GATT differentiated be-
tween export subsidies, aids to promote foreign sales, and
domestic subsidies, which benefit an industry without re-
gard to where its product is sold.12 Export subsidies were
forbidden on primary products, defined generally as fish,
9 Id.; see also The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.IAS. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAT].
10 GATT, supra note 9, art. XVI(1).
1 SeeJACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 768-69.
12 SeeJOHN M. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 256, 259 (1989).
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farm, or forest products, if the subsidy permitted the coun-
try to obtain "more than an equitable share of world export
trade in that product." 3 For non-primary products, de-
fined as everything else, parties agreed to "cease to grant
either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy" on their
exports if the result was a lower price in foreign markets
than in the domestic market.14 This effectively forbade bi-
level pricing on non-primary products.1 5 If these obliga-
tions were violated, Article VI of the GATT authorized
countries to impose countervailing duties.16 This remedy
has an equally complex history which is outside the scope of
this paper. Basically, if a subsidy obligation was violated, a
government was allowed to impose a tariff on that good in
an amount proportional to the subsidy, though each coun-
try has entertained evolving additional rules and require-
ments on these tariffs.
Because the original GATT was so effective in reducing
direct tariffs, the Tokyo Round, which lasted from 1973 un-
til 1979, focused on the reduction of subsidies and other
nontariff barriers.1 7 Conversely, at that time, governments
were under increasing pressure to grant subsidies, espe-
cially to industries ailing from the worldwide recession.
Therefore, the United States and the European Community
agreed that the aim of the resulting 1979 Subsidies Code
was not to eliminate the subsidies themselves, a drastic re-
sult, but to "reduce or eliminate [their] trade-restricting or
distorting effects.""'
As negotiation proceeded, it became clear that the
United States looked to this round to have subsidization,
but the European Community countered that "stringent in-
ternational regulation of domestic subsidies would amount
Is GATT, supra note 9, art. XVI(3).
14 Id. art. XVI(4).
15 The distinction between primary and non-primary goods in these additional
obligations caused their rejection by developing countries, so that most GATT na-
tions did not recognize them. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 728.
16 Id. at 769.
17 McDonough, supra note 2, at 816.
is Subsidies Code, supra note 3, at Preamble.
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to intolerable interference in their internal policy mat-
ters." 9 Nonetheless, the European Community was willing
to bargain because it wanted to soften the U.S. policy of
imposing countervailing duties against foreign industries
even when the opposing U.S. industry was not "materially
injured" by the subsidies. °
The two sides compromised by using different rules for
domestic and export subsidies.2 1 Export subsidies were abso-
lutely forbidden for non-primary products,22 but they were
only forbidden for primary products if they resulted in a
country having more than an equitable share of world ex-
port trade in that product.2 3 Conversely, in Article XI of
the Subsidies Code, the contracting parties recognized that
domestic subsidies "are widely used as important instruments
for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives
and do not intend to restrict the right of signatories to use
such subsidies."24 These domestic subsidies were permit-
ted, but actionable by countervailing duties, subject to a
material injury requirement, which was the main United
States concession for the ban on export subsidies.
The Subsidies Code thus provided a two-track approach,
permitting domestic subsidies and forbidding export subsi-
dies.2 5 Unfortunately, the distinction between these two is
not always clear. Furthermore, the Code did not define the
term "subsidy," but merely provided an illustrative list of
permissible subsidies based on their actions and objec-
tives.26 Yet, as the subsequent negotiations over the aircraft
manufacturing industry illustrate, the most glaring failure
of the Tokyo Round was that the permitted domestic subsi-
dies were just as contentious and effective in distorting
trade as the now-outlawed export subsidies.
'9 McDonough, supra note 2, at 816.
0 See id. at 816-17.
21 See id. at 817; Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 11(1).
- Subsidies Code, supra note 3, art. 9.
23 Id. art. 10(1).
24 Id. art. 11(1).
25 Id. arts. 9 & 11.
26 Id. art. 9 & Annex.
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III. TWO DIFFERENT TRADE PARADIGMS
The subsidies question plagues the GATT talks primarily
because the major negotiating teams, the United States and
the European Community, have two fundamentally oppos-
ing historical attitudes towards subsidization. 27 The Euro-
pean political systems have traditionally mingled the public
and private sectors. This tradition was reinvigorated as Eu-
rope emerged from World War II, battered and bruised,
and dependent on massive governmental support to re-
build its torn economies. The notion of government in-
volvement in industry continues today.
Conversely, in the United States government encroach-
ment anywhere was viewed suspiciously and was deemed ac-
ceptable only under rare circumstances. For example, the
French believe that government is responsible for an indi-
vidual's health and well-being from the cradle to the grave,
whereas in the United States, governmental support is sup-
posed to provide its citizens with a backstop to be used only
in times of emergency. Similarly, much of European indus-
try remains nationalized or dependent on governmental
support, whereas in the United States, aid is only expected
in times of emergency, such as the Chrysler bailout of the
early 1980s.
The two systems' approaches to subsidies reflect these at-
titudes. The European Community views demands to limit
domestic subsidies as interference with the responsibilities
and rights of its national governments, whereas the United
States sees them as an intrusion on the principles of the
free market. "U.S. policy has been guided by an economic
and political philosophy which presumes that subsidies dis-
tort resource allocations and international trade flows, un-
dercut economic efficiency, and flout the law of
comparative advantage by enabling the development and
survival of otherwise uncompetitive industries.""8
2 See generally, Robin Gaster, European Industrial Policy, in EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN THE 1990s 257-70 (Glennon S. Harrison
ed., 1994).
28 McDonough, supra note 2, at 844.
1995] 1197
1198 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE [60
Recently, though, industry and government leaders have
made ever-more persistent attempts to change this long-
held view. Many scholars call for government "to reexam-
ine the political economy and philosophical foundations of
our trading rules."2 9 Some point to the historical success of
managed industries in the United States, such as agricul-
ture and the railroads, as precedents for a new active gov-
ernmental role.3 ° It appears that doctrinal reasons remain
the main impediment to these calls for a new U.S. position.
At a recent Senate hearing this difficulty was concisely
framed in a response by the Chairman of Bell Laboratories:
Well, look, let us be blunt. If you use the term industrial
policy, certain people close their ears and certain people re-ject what you are saying. ... I think what we need to be
discussing is what should we be doing to keep our industry
competitive and what should we not be doing. And if that is
called industrial policy, fine. I happen to agree. 31
This debate has been confused by the unclear subsidizing
effects of the massive U.S. defense budget, which in many
ways supports and finances industry research and produc-
tion. The European Community frequently points out, and
many in the United States agree, that this has the same
practical effect on U.S. industry as more direct subsidies.
Senator Patrick Moynihan stated curtly: "If [anyone] wants
to know whether we should have an industrial policy, in the
name of God for the last 45 years, we have had the most
explicit industrial policy in the world. And that is the cold
war."3 ' Despite this apparent inconsistency of views, the "of-
ficial U.S. position ... is to avoid any active industrial pol-
icy, preferring . . . to let the market pick winners and
Robert E. Scott, Flat Earth Economics: Is There a New International Trade Paradigm?,
CHALLENGE, Sept. 1993, at 32. The author abandons comparative advantage theory
because of its inability to account for intra-industry trade and external market
imperfections.
30 Lane Kirkland, Industrial Policy: An Answer to Economic Chaos, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 73 (1993).
-1 Trade and Competitiveness of US. Industty: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1992) (testimony of Ian M. Ross, President Emeritus,
AT&T Bell Laboratories).
32 Id. at 63.
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losers."3 3 An additional political concern with subsidization
or industrial policy is that it results in increased govern-
ment expenditures. At least since the Reagan years, the Re-
publican party has consistently objected that industrial
policy will lead to larger governmental interference, larger
budget deficits, and greater inefficiency.
The negotiations between the United States and the Eu-
ropean Community over aircraft subsidies reflect these two
differing trade paradigms, exhibit the practical difficulties
involved in reconciling them, and manifest the problem of
how to account for U.S. defense expenditures in resolving
the subsidies question. The European Community aircraft
consortium, Airbus, has been a major success. Formed in
1968 by combining four European Community govern-
ment-sponsored aircraft manufacturers, 4 Airbus is now sec-
ond only to Boeing in jet aircraft production. Airbus has
shattered what was once an American monopoly.3 5 In the
past decade, its share of the global aircraft market in-
creased from seven percent in 1980 to twenty-seven percent
in 1989, while the United States market share declined
from eighty-seven percent to sixty-five percent.3 6
This success has been achieved, in major part, through
various types of direct and indirect subsidies, valued at up
to $26 billion. These subsidies include development and
program launch grants, funding of research programs, eq-
uity infusions, unpaid "loans," and exchange rate guaran-
" Trade and Technology: Implications of the GATT Negotiations: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Science, Space and Tech-
nology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991) (opening statement of chairman Tim
Valentine) [hereinafter Trade and Technology Hearings].
34 The consortium consists of the Deutsche Airbus unit of Germany's Daimler-
Benz AG, Britain's British Aerospace PLC, France's Aerospatiale, and Spain's Casa.
35 See generally CONG. RES. SERV. FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETI-
TIVENESS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE AND TECHNOLOGY, 102D CONG., 2D
SEss., AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: AN ECONOMIC AND TRADE PERSPECTIVE 4 (Comm. Print
1992) [hereinafter AIRBUS REPORT].
- Stuart Auerbach, Turbulence Ahead for the Airbus Talks: Bush Administration Threat-
ens Trade Complaint if Subsidy Issue Isn't Settled by Sept. 30, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1990,
at H1.
37 See AIRBUS REPORT, supra note 35, at 24-36.
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tees. 8 Additionally, a recent report commissioned by the
U.S. Department of Commerce concluded that the Airbus
had never made a profit on the sale of its aircraft and had
never achieved "commercial viability."39 In fact, no one dis-
putes that the industry is subsidized, but the European
Community explains that its subsidization is necessary to
provide technology, jobs, national prestige, and security,
and that, in any event, since 1945 the United States has in-
directly subsidized its own aircraft industry through defense
expenditures. The U.S. industry, comprised of Boeing, Mc-
Donnell Douglas, and Hughes Aircraft, and represented by
the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), has long ob-
jected to the subsidization of Airbus, but has tempered its
response. AIA is afraid that too much pressure on Airbus
will alienate the European Community, freezing the U.S.
aerospace industry out of the world's second largest market.
Despite these differences, the European Community and
the United States both signed the Civil Aircraft Code of
1979 at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round. It was the
Round's only industry-specific agreement.40 Throughout
these negotiations, the United States and the European
Community maintained their traditional positions. The
United States maintained that the aircraft industry should
operate on the basis of commercial competition, while the
European Community wanted to continue its subsidies.4"
The 1979 agreement ducked the subsidies question but lib-
eralized aircraft trade by eliminating tariffs, prohibiting li-
censing requirements, and banning discriminatory
procurement.42 However, this agreement did not cover air-
craft subsidies, and its relationship with the Subsidies Code,
's Id. at 24.
Jennifer A- Manner, How to Avoid Airbus II: A Primerfor Domestic Industry, 23 CAL.
W. INT'L LJ. 139, 142 (1992) (citing Gellman Research Associates, An Economic and
Financial Review of Airbus Industrie, Sept. 4, 1990, at 4-3 to 4-8).
40 AIRBUS REPORT, supra note 35, at 39.
41 Id. at 37 (citing GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO




passed at the same time, was "uncertain from the start."43
Thus, heading into the Uruguay Round, the issue of aircraft
subsidies was revealed.
IV. THE URUGUAY ROUND
A. THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING
MEASURES
At the commencement of the Uruguay Round subsidies
negotiations, the United States' foremost objective was to
strengthen multilateral subsidy disciplines.44 The United
States hoped to ban all export subsidies on both primary
and non-primary goods, and extend domestic subsidies dis-
ciplines to other uncovered areas, such as industrial target-
ing, through clarification of terms and implementation of
dispute settlement rules.45 Finally, the United States
wanted to preserve the effectiveness of its countervailing
duty law and practice. The Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 summarized the U.S. strategy: "to de-
fine, deter, discourage the persistent use of, and otherwise
discipline unfair trade practices having adverse trade ef-
fects, including forms of subsidy ....
The European Community retained the same objectives
that it had in the Tokyo Round. The European Community
hoped to continue to use domestic subsidies as well as to
limit the effectiveness of U.S. countervailing duty law. Its
basic premise was that subsidies are legitimate policy tools
to aid industries and regions in economic transition.47 The
43 Id. At the time, the aircraft industry expressed doubts as to future compliance
that were justified by recent congressional testimony calling for ensuring European
compliance. "[T]he U.S. Government should ensure that, as required by the GATr
Civil Aircraft Code, Airbus prices fully reflect the recoupment of all costs ...."
Financial Condition of the Airline Industry: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation of the House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 588 (1993) (testimony of Lawrence Clarkson, Corporate Vice President, The
Boeing Co.).
4 See Ronald K. Lorentzen, Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Measures, Bus. AM.,
Jan. 1994, at 13.
45 Id.
- 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (8) (A) (1988).
7 See McDonough, supra note 2, at 845.
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European Community looked to a definition of subsidies
that would permit these types of aid. Furthermore, because
of its more direct subsidization, the European Community
hoped to measure subsidies by their cost to government,
while the United States preferred measuring subsidies by
the actual benefit received.
The U.S. aircraft industry played a complex role in the
Uruguay Round because its size and strategic importance
allowed it directly to influence the official U.S. negotiating
position in the GATT. The industry, represented by the
AIA, generally agreed with the U.S. position of demanding
clearer definitions of subsidies, but it also wanted more ef-
fective dispute settlement, thereby "restoring credibility to
the GATT process" and reducing the need for unilateral
U.S. responses.48 The industry also wanted to shorten the
proposed five-year grace period to bring subsidies into con-
formity and require a presumption of serious prejudice for
all actionable subsidies.4 9 On the other side, Airbus agreed
with the European Community's attempts to halt further
limits on subsidization.
Eventually, the seven-year negotiations produced substan-
tial limitations on subsidies use. Most importantly, after
forty-five years of negotiations, the parties agreed on the
definition of a subsidy.50 For GATT purposes, a subsidy is
deemed to exist if "there is a financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a
Member" involving (1) a potential or actual "direct transfer
of funds or liabilities;" (2) a foregone government revenue;
(3) government provided goods or services separate from
the infrastructure; or (4) "any form of income or price sup-
port in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT" which confers
a benefit.5' This broad definition is narrowed by a require-
AIA NEWSL. (Aerospace Industries Ass'n), Vol. 4, No. 6, Dec. 1991.
49Id.
so Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec 15, 1993, art. 1.1,
reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS 264 (1994) [hereinafter Subsidies Code 1993J; Lorentzen, supra note 44, at
13.
", Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 1.1.
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ment that the subsidy actually benefit an industry and a re-
quirement that the subsidy be "specific to an enterprise or
industry or group of enterprises or industries."51 2 The latter
requirement reflects U.S. countervailing duty law and main-
tains its distinctions, allowing sub-national (state) subsidies,
but prohibiting central government subsidies to a region,
even if generally available.5"
The agreement then classifies subsidies into three
groups: prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable.54 Pro-
hibited subsidies are those contingent on export perform-
ance or upon the use of domestic over imported goods, and
are specifically set forth in Annex I of the agreement.55
Members are allowed three years to eliminate these prohib-
ited subsidies, which appear to include a ban on all export
subsidies (de jure and de facto) as well as local content
rules. 6 Actionable subsidies are those that cause "adverse
effects to the interests of other members," defined as injury
to their domestic industry, nullification of GATT benefits,
or serious prejudice to another member's interests.5 7 Here,
a presumption of serious prejudice exists where (1) the to-
tal ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeds five per-
cent (based on the cost to the granting government); (2)
the subsidy covers direct forgiveness of debt; or (3) the sub-
sidy covers operating losses sustained by a single firm if pro-
vided on more than one occasion." The remedy provisions
of these first two categories clarify the means for demon-
strating the use of subsidies and create an obligation to re-
move them once identified.5 9
52 Id. art. 2.1.
" Lorentzen, supra note 44, at 13. For a critique of the specificity test see Trade
and Technology Hearings, supra note 33, at 42-45 (statement of Charles Owen Verrill,
Jr., adjunct Professor of International Trade Law, Georgetown University Law
Center and Partner, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington D.C.).
54 Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, arts. 3-8; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 6, at
770.
11 Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 3 & Annex I.
5' Lorentzen, supra note 44, at 13.
57 Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 5.
58 Id. art. 6 & Annex IV. Note that article 6.7 exempts several specific subsidies
granted for non-trade based reasons.
51 Lorentzen, supra note 44, at 13.
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The final category, non-actionable subsidies, includes
safe harbor provisions for three types of subsidies. Into this
category fall all subsidies which are non-specific as provided
in Article II, as well as those for (1) general industrial re-
search, if limited to seventy-five percent of eligible research,
costs, and fifty percent of precompetitive development ac-
tivity; (2) regional development within areas that are neu-
trally determined to be disadvantaged; and (3) plant
adaptation to environmental standards, as long as limited to
twenty percent of a one-time operation.6 °
This is the first time the GATT specifically allows certain
subsidies, a fact which, predictably, has caused strong oppo-
sition in the United States. In January 1994, forty-four Re-
publican senators suggested to U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor that they would vote against the GATT solely
because these provisions "promote industrial policy."6 The
senators' willingness to threaten to reject the seven-year
agreement over this one issue exhibits the far-reaching po-
tential and revolutionary nature of the new Subsidies Code.
This new Code seems to incorporate most of the U.S. de-
mands, providing for subsidy measurements based on the
benefit conferred to the recipient, as well as for more bind-
ing dispute resolution. 62 The new Code also appears to de-
ter questionable subsidies by setting out clear rules as well
as providing for swift remedies. The new system should
benefit U.S. research and development (R&D) programs
that will no longer be vulnerable to foreign pressure to dis-
close their direction under the guise of unfair trade prac-
tice. 63  In addition, the new system will benefit U.S.
exporters of "clean technology" equipment and processes.'
- Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50, art. 8.
w1 Sen. Danforth Seeks Way to End Dispute with Administration Over GATT Accord, Irr'i.
TRADE DAILY, Mar. 10, 1994, at D2. The article suggests that a compromise is possi-
ble based on the consultation and remedy provisions of Article 9.




The Subsidies Code also responds to U.S. demand by pro-
viding a shorter three year compliance period.65
For these benefits, the United States had to agree to the
adoption of the green light provisions which expressly allow
certain subsidies.6 This major doctrinal concession is a
boon for the European Community, where many explicit
subsidy programs are already in place.67 Only time will tell
whether this concession reflects, or will provoke, a new U.S.
recognition of the benefits of industrial policy. This new
system has the potential to cause fundamental changes in
the U.S. economy if, as Republican critics insist, it encour-
ages the increased use of government subsidies in these
permitted areas.6a Yet the Subsidies Code also is significant
for what it does not contain. Most notably it does not con-
tain any agreement on the aircraft industry, the largest U.S.
exporter. In the final days of negotiations, this single issue
threatened to deny the world system all the benefits of
seven years of hard work.69
B. THE FIGHT OVER AIRCRAFT SUBSIDIES
Airbus and the U.S. aircraft manufacturers have claimed
that they are subject to unfair competition.7" Each believes
the other uses unfair trade practices to gain market lever-
age.71 In short, the United States position is that the
Europeans are unfairly subsidizing their industry, making it
difficult to compete, while Airbus believes that the U.S.
manufacturers are also subsidized, albeit indirectly,
through the massive U.S. defense program.7 2
65 Subsidies Code 1993, supra note 50.
- Id. art. 8.
67 See AIRBUS REPORT, supra note 35, at 21-31.
sSen. Danforth Seeks Ways to End Dispute with Administration Over GATT Accord,
supra note 61, at D2.
"See, e.g., Aerospace Industy Could Pull Support for Aviation-Compromised GATT,
AEROSPACE DAILY, Dec. 10, 1993 at 400; see infra Part IV.B.4.
70 See ARBus REPORT, supra note 35, at 9.
71 Id.
72 French Aircraft Industy Calls for Indirect Subsidies, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Dec. 22,
1993, at D8.
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The GATT negotiations have traditionally been viewed as
the proper forum to settle this dispute. The aircraft manu-
facturing industry holds a unique position in the GATT ne-
gotiations for several reasons. The industry is one of the
world's largest and, yet, is comprised of only a few players.
Thus, especially in the United States, the industry leaders
have an ability to formulate, and not just respond to, offi-
cial policy. The market of buyers is also limited, demand-
ing special deference to their concerns. For example, most
industries, suspecting a GATT violation, would simply file a
countervailing duty action, but the U.S. aircraft industry
sees this option as unavailing:
The Europeans are much [closer] together and ... in sev-
eral cases the airlines are, in fact, controlled or owned in
large part by the governments. They have made it quite
clear that if we bring a countervailing duty case, they will
immediately bring a like action against us and.., we will be
in a real trade war.7
After the limited success of the Tokyo Round, the United
States waited until 1984 to begin negotiations with the Eu-
ropean Community to "limit and eventually eliminate subsi-
dies [like those] paid to Airbus."74 This process lingered
for the rest of the decade, while "the U.S. civil aircraft in-
dustry sat quietly on the sidelines" and watched Airbus be-
come the world's second largest manufacturer, replacing
McDonnell Douglas.7- Although concerned with the GATT
subsidies negotiations, the industry realized that the Civil
Aviation Agreement of 197976 was not up for renegotiation
7 U.S. International Trade Performance and Outlook: Competitive Position in the Automo-
tive, Aerospace, and Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sectors: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 462 (1992) (statement of Lawrence Clarkson, Corporate Vice President, The
Boeing Co.).
74 Manner, supra note 39, at 141.
75 Id.
76 Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft of April 12, 1979 on Trade in Larger Civil Aircraft, July 17, 1992, U.S.-
EC, available at Office of the United States Trade Representative Executive Office of
the President, Washington, D.C., 20506 [hereinafter Agreement Concerning the Ap-
plication of the GATT Agreement].
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and that its best interests might be served in bilateral nego-
tiations." In 1987, for the first time, the United States and
the European Community began informal negotiations
over limiting Airbus subsidies outside of the GATT frame-
work to hedge against the possibility that the GATT might
prove to be unsuccessful. 78 One insightful industry spokes-
man cautioned that "we can expect to see many agenda
items deferred again when the Uruguay Round comes to a
close."79
1. The German Exchange Rate Case
The bilateral negotiations yielded initial success. The
United States moved from advocating a position of no gov-
ernment subsidies for development to conceding to a limit
of twenty-five percent. The European Community repre-
sentatives moved from a seventy-five percent limit to a forty
to forty-five percent range. 0 But here the parties stale-
mated, at least until the United States discovered an explicit
export subsidy provided to Deutsche Airbus. In part be-
cause of pressure put on EC manufacturers by the declining
dollar, 1 the Airbus partner was provided exchange rate
guarantees by its government, under the auspices of a priva-
tization program, worth an estimated $2.5 million on each
Airbus aircraft delivered in 1990.2 The U.S. team decided
to bring a GATT action against the European Community
in the hope of softening its intransigence in the negotia-
tions.83 In January 1992, a GAT dispute panel ruled that
the German program was in breach of the Subsidies Code
because it was an export subsidy covered by the Annex to
7 AIRBUS REPORT, supra note 35, at 39.
78 Id.
- Robert E. Robeson, U.S. Trade Policy at the Crossroads, AIA NEWSL. (Aerospace
Industries Ass'n), Vol. 1, No. 7,Jan. 1989.
80 ARusS REPORT, sura note 35, at 41.
81 Id. at 40.
82 Manner, sura note 39, at 148.
83 Id.
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the 1979 Subsidies Code, subsection j, which prohibits cer-
tain exchange rate insurance programs.8 4
This decision had two repercussions. First, it pointed out
the ineffectiveness of the current GATT Subsidies Code, be-
cause the European Community later blocked adoption of
the ruling, which was required for any remedial measures
to be put in place.85 Second, it hastened the conclusion of
the bilateral agreement, because it determined that the is-
sue, although blocked, was nonetheless covered by the Sub-
sidies Code and not just the evolving agreement. a6. The
importance of this distinction is twofold. First, the Euro-
pean Community was now on notice that its Airbus subsi-
dies put it in the uncomfortable position of having to block
future actions under the Subsidies Code. This ruling also
made it apparent that the European Community system vio-
lated international law, as set forth by the GATT, an untena-
ble position for a major trading power to keep for very long
over such a hody contested issue. After its victory, the
United States brought a second, broader action under the
Subsidies Code against Airbus subsidies.87 In response, the
European Community finally lowered its development cap
to the thirty to thirty-nine percent range.88
2. The 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement
In July 1992, the European Community and the United
States signed an agreement that provided a solution to the
aircraft dispute.89 The agreement, which recognizes that
disciplines in the GATT Civil Aircraft Code of 1979 "should
be strengthened with a view toward progressively reducing
the role of government support,"90 sets up a cap on subsi-
84 Id.
5, Id. at 149.
"" See Aerospace Industy Could Pull Support for Aviation-Compromised GA7T, supra
note 69, at 400.
:7 Id.; Manner, supra note 39, at 150.
A AIRBus REPORT, supra note 35, at 42.
Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement, supra note
76.
-0 Id. at Preamble.
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dies for developmental support at thirty-three percent of to-
tal development costs and requires a reasonable
expectation of recoupment of these subsidies within seven-
teen years.91 The latter provision is designed to counter Eu-
ropean Community allegations that its subsidies will be
repaid. The more indirect aid given to aircraft develop-
ment in the United States through the military budget is
limited to three percent of annual industry turnover and
four percent of the value of each firm's annual sales.92 The
agreement only covers aircraft with more than one hun-
dred seats and, importantly, calls for further negotiation
under the GATT.93
In exchange for these restraints, the United States "caved
in on its longstanding position that defense contracts aren't
subsidies for U.S. firms."94 This seems to be a reasonable
and timely decision, because of the shrinking military
budget. Despite this concession, the U.S. industry was
pleased with the agreement. As a Boeing official explained:
[This agreement] will for the first time provide real disci-
plines over certain Airbus subsidies. The agreement in-
cludes a ban on production supports, which is noteworthy
in that this is the first agreement in which a domestic sub-
sidy is prohibited. Furthermore, the agreement provides for
a cap, terms, and conditions on development funding which
will dramatically reduce Airbus' ability to subsidize new air-
craft models.95
Of course, many problems still exist. The United States
effectively managed to limit subsidies through this bilateral
agreement to thirty-three percent of total development
costs, down from previous European Community subsidies
Id.
I d. art. 5.
93 Id. Annex II; U.S., EC Sign Agreement Restricting Subsidies to Civil Aircraft Industy, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1243 (July 22, 1992).
94 Aerospace Industy Wary of Looming Trade War, AEROSPACE DAILY, Nov. 16, 1992, at
245.
95 Improving the Competitiveness of U.S. Industry: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1992) (statement of Lawrence W. Clarkson, Vice
President, Planning and International Development, The Boeing Co.).
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of about sixty percent, but this is still an enormous amount
of subsidization.96 This concern over the amount of subsi-
dization led the industry back to the GATT subsidies negoti-
ations, where the United Statestried to incorporate and
strengthen the agreement and the European Community
tried to back away from its previous commitments.
3. The Aircraft Industry and the Subsidies Negotiations
As attention focused on the GATT subsidies negotiations,
the U.S. aircraft manufacturers and Airbus disagreed on the
relationship between the 1992 agreement and the upcom-
ing Subsidies Code.97 The U.S. negotiators wanted the talks
to leave the 1992 Agreement intact and perhaps build on its
commitments, while the European Community wanted a
code that abrogated the bilateral agreement and made it
harder for anyone to win relief under the GATI. 98 The Eu-
ropean Community also argued, alternatively, that the bilat-
eral agreement implied that aircraft are excluded from
coverage under the Subsidies Code, a reversal of the Ger-
man Rate case. 99
The U.S. industry countered that "[a]ll efforts to exclude
aircraft from the disciplines of any strengthened Subsidies
Code must be resisted." 100 The U.S. industry also wanted
further dispute control mechanisms and urged the U.S.
government for increased indirect support, such as financ-
ing from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.101 These arguments
for a U.S. industrial policy were couched in terms of
"greater government cooperation and understanding."0 '
As 1993 progressed, the debate became more heated.
The European Community claimed that the U.S. industry
U.S., EC Sign Agreement, supra note 93, at 1243.
97 McDonough, supra note 2, at 956.
9 Id.
Id. at 952 n.780, 956.
100 Civil Aircraft Needs Continued Coverage Under the Subsidies Code, US. Industry Says,
9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1386 (Aug. 12, 1992) (statement ofJohn Hay-




requests for additional indirect subsidies showed a lack of
good faith and said that U.S. efforts to include aircraft in
the GATT were "aimed at strangling the European aircraft
industry."1 0 3 Simultaneously, the French minister "unveiled
an $87 million program [subsidy] to promote quality in in-
dustrial production."1 0 4
As the GATT deadline of December 15, 1993 ap-
proached, the pressure mounted on both the European
Community and the United States to come to some kind of
agreement on this issue.10 5 But instead of striving towards
consensus, the two sides began making further demands,
because their respective industries were concerned that
their governments would sacrifice industry interests for the
GATT agreement as a whole.106 Each industry became ner-
vous that it would be "used as a last minute bargaining
chip" to reach a final overall accord. 10 7 The European
Community asked for a "grandfather clause" to the Subsi-
dies Code, so that the agreement would exempt programs
already in place, and for further restraints on indirect sup-
ports, accusing the U.S. industry of violating the four per-
cent limit of the 1992 agreement.
1 0 8
United States leaders were in a difficult position. First,
they wanted to ensure that there would be no retreat from
the 1992 bilateral agreement, which placed a thirty-three
percent cap on development subsidies.'0 9 They also hoped
for additional limits from the Subsidies Code.110 Their fear
was that only one of the provisions, of only one of the trea-
10 French Trade Official Says Airbus' Fears in GATT Talks Are Unjustified, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1687 (Oct. 6, 1993) (statement of French Trade and
Industry Minister Gerard Longuet).
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., French Aerospace Group Says EC on "Offensive" Concerning Subsidies, INr'L
TRADE DMLy, Dec. 7, 1993, at D9.
106 See id.
107 Id.
10 French Aerospace Group Says EC On "Offensive" Concerning Subsidies, supra note
105, at D9.
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ties, would apply."' If that occurred, the European Com-
munity would either keep its thirty-three percent subsidies,
or be able to subsidize according to the new code, which
allows certain types of subsidies under its safe harbor provi-
sions. The United States would then have to prove that
each subsidy was one of the prohibited types, requiring ex-
cessive monitoring, litigation, and investigation that the
leaders hoped to avoid.1 12
4. The Agreement Not To Agree
In hindsight, it is easy to see that the two sides would be
unable to resolve their differences before the GATT dead-
line of December 15, 1993. The European Community had
recently given what it deemed substantial concessions in the
1992 bilateral agreement. Similarly, the United States was
not about to backpedal from its thirty-three percent limit
on subsidies, nor accept "a proposal that effectively ex-
cludes aircraft from coverage in the overall Subsidies
Code."1 1 3 The U.S. industry believed that the only reason
for reaching the 1992 agreement in the first place was be-
cause the GATT panel decided that Airbus subsidies were
covered by the subsidies regime. 114
Furthermore, the GATT talks covered an estimated two
trillion dollars in annual world trade, of which the aircraft
industry accounted for only several billion dollars. As one
Aerospatiale official put it, "[t]o let such a small amount
spark what could be one of the most punishing tariff wars
unleashed in recent memory would be 'absurd.' "113 The
aircraft subsidy issue had to be resolved by December 15,
1993, to assure passage of seven years of GATT negotiations
in all the other areas.
I1 Id.
112 Id.
113 Aerospace Industry Could Pull Support For Aviation- Compromised GATT, supra note
69, at 400.
114 Id.
115 Aerospace Industry Wary of Looming Trade War, AEROSPACE DAILY, Nov. 16, 1992,
at 245.
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Days before the December 15 deadline, executives of the
U.S. aerospace industry wrote a letter to U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Mickey Kantor saying that the United States was
"conceding much more than it obtains"116 and that their
"bottom line" was that aircraft could not be excluded from
subsidies coverage, nor subjected solely to it." 7 Their con-
cern was that if the Subsidies Code were the exclusive fo-
rum, the European Community would gain the advantage
of being able to classify each of its individual subsidies into
a permitted or non-actionable category of the new Subsi-
dies Code.' 18 Also problematic was that "the EC would ob-
tain the extension of disciplines on indirect supports into
the multilateral dispute settlement procedure, a potentially
damaging and far-reaching concession." 19 As it stood
under the 1992 agreement, only the direct supports were
tallied to determine whether they exceeded the thirty-three
percent cap.12 1 In an attempt to build on the 1992 agree-
ment, the letter called for a one year period during which
neither side would challenge subsidies under GATT.
12 1
The U.S. industry also desired the GATT agreement as a
whole to receive the benefits of all other GATT provisions.
Like the automobile industry, aircraft manufacturing is
truly international in that components are shipped from all
over the world. The industry could not afford to lose the
benefit of the non-subsidy tariff reductions. The U.S. in-
dustry's position as of December 13, 1992 was summarized
16 Aircraft Agreement Shouldn't Be Bound By GATT Deadline, Executives Say, AERO-
SPACE DAILY, Dec. 10, 1993, at 404.
117 See id.
118 Id. In fact, in Senate testimony, it was agreed that one could drive "a 747
through" the current subsidies code. U.S. International Trade Peformance and Outlook:
Competitive Position in the Automotive, Aerospace, and Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sectors:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 467 (1992) (statement of Lawrence Clarkson, Corporate Vice Presi-
dent, The Boeing Co.).
119 Many In Industry Support GATTAccord, INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 17, 1993, at
D1I.
1 Aerospace Industry Could Pull Support for Aviation-Compromised GATT, supra note
69, at 400.
2 Aerospace Leaders Push Kantor to Head Off Civil Aircraft GATT Code, AEROSPACE
DALY, Dec. 13, 1993, at 410.
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by an Aerospace Industry Association official: "We advanced
an interim solution which said let's give ourselves a year to
settle this problem on a good faith effort, and let's agree to
extend the standstill on bringing people before (the
GATT) for a violation."122
Ultimately, the U.S. industry's proposal was accepted,
though it resulted in "howls of protest from French and
German industrialists" 23 who believe that "the Americans
are allowed to continue to provide unlimited support for
their aerospace industry through indirect subsidies" be-
cause of a lack of enforcement of the 1992 agreement. 124
Under the final proposal, the aircraft industry is temporar-
ily covered under the 1979 Subsidies Code with the new dis-
pute resolution of the Uruguay Round. 125 While it appears
that the U.S. industry gained the final advantage, this is
only because the Europeans almost succeeded in abrogat-
ing the 1992 agreement or gaining exclusive GATT cover-
age. In short, neither side won, but the battle remains for
another day.
5. The Next Time
After all of the last-minute drama, the bottom line is that
the aircraft subsidy negotiations are back where they
started. The industry, however, will receive its share of the
predicted $300 billion of trade benefits from the overall
GATT package. 126 The U.S. industry appears to be pleased
with the GATT talks, proclaiming that "despite a very tough
negotiating position from the EC, ... the United States
negotiators supported the aerospace industry."127 The AIA
122 Id.
123 U.S., Europe Set Aside Aviation Dispute To Speed Uruguay Round, AEROSPACE DAILY,
Dec. 14, 1993, at 415.
124 Economists Say Industry's GA7T Grumbles Prove Process Is Working, AEROSPACE
DAILY, Dec. 15, 1993, at 426 (statement of Wolfgang Piller, Vice President of Ger-
many's Deutsche Aerospace).
125 Id.
-2 See U.S., Europe Set Aside Aviation Dispute to Speed Uruguay Round, supra note 123,
at 415.
127 Many in Industry Support GATT Accord, supra note 119, at D1I (statement of Don
Fuqua, President AA).
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released a white paper, claiming that the resolution's prin-
cipal benefits are coverage of aircraft components under
the Subsidies Code, access to new dispute settlement proce-
dures, and the refusal to exclude aircraft subsidies from the
new Code.128
Unfortunately, the negotiations may be more challenging
the second time around. The United States now has the
added problem of negotiating around two "footnotes" that
were added to the Subsidies Code at the very last minute:
the "first gives some added protection to the kinds of subsi-
dies used in Europe ... [and] the second makes it harder
for countries looking for GATT relief to prove that a given
subsidy distorts the market."12 9 The two sides, furthermore,
used up substantial energy and resources over the GATI
fight and perhaps also lost their trust and willingness to
work together.1 3 0
Recently, the European Community accused the United
States of trying to "dismantle Europe's system of support,"
while guaranteeing impunity for its own.' 3 1 The French in-
dustry has asked its government for additional indirect sub-
sidies, so that the European Community may negotiate on
equal terms with the United States next time.13 2 President
Clinton has already called for close monitoring of the Euro-
pean Community subsidies to ensure compliance with the
1992 agreement, and he has called for the use of American
embassies to "track and report" on the actions of the Airbus
countries.13 3 Whether this is simply a return to rhetoric
now that the pressure is off remains to be seen, but, while
the two sides have agreed to a one year extension, it is fortu-
128 Id.
129 European Parliament Calls for Strategy to Help Aircraft Sector Manufacturers, INT'L
TRADE DALY, Dec. 16, 1993, at D1O.
- After Unuay Round, Bilateral Negotiators Must Renew Old Bonds, AEROSPACE
DALY, Jan. 5, 1994, at 15.
'3' Id.
"3French Aircraft Industry Calls for Indirect Subsidies, INT'L TRADE DAiLY, Dec. 22,
1993, at D8.
- U.S. Plans Close Monitoring of US.-EU "Airbus" Agreement, INT'L TRADE DAILY,
Jan. 10, 1994, at D5.
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nate that they actually have until the middle of 1995 (when
the 1992 agreement expires) to come to a compromise.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Uruguay Round subsidies negotiations taught us sev-
eral lessons. First, the Round affirmed that the sheer scope
of the GATT talks assures their successful completion. In
the final days of negotiations there were several additional
contentious areas, such as labor standards and motion pic-
ture quotas. Yet there was already too much at stake to al-
low these formidable obstacles to halt seven years of
negotiations. In fact, the intensity of these disputes reflects
the parties' actual commitment to the GATT process. Yet
there are a few troubling aspects to these last minute ma-
neuvers. First, many countries outside of the United States
and European Community complained that in the final
days they were all but ignored,134 leading to feelings of
marginalization from the GATT talks and the world econ-
omy. The two parties' brinkmanship has led other coun-
tries to reassess their influence in the GATT talks.
Second, leaving vital sectors of the world economy out of
GATT agreements is a dangerous precedent. If major in-
dustries are excluded from GATT coverage, its overall effec-
tiveness is lessened, as is the incentive for further GATT
negotiations. Bilateral agreements are less likely to demand
principled reductions of world trade barriers, the original
GATT mission. Specifically, failure of the aircraft negotia-
tions provides little hope for a resolution under any new
GATT talks and increases the likelihood of some kind of
adjustment in the 1992 bilateral agreement.
Conversely, many commentators view the omission of ma-
jor industries from the talks in a more favorable light. They
point out that certain industries, like the aircraft industry,
are unique and that fragmentation of negotiations is the
most effective way for resolution. But this argument seems
to miss the fundamental point of the GATT: reduction of
- And Now For Something Completely Different, THE EC)NOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 59.
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artificial barriers to increase world prosperity. Allowing in-
dividual industry exemptions removes any pressure for mul-
tilateral negotiation. Taken to an extreme, this would
render the GATT useless. One author summarized the the-
ory of comparative advantage applicable to the aircraft in-
dustry: "as a large economy of 224 million people, the U.S.
is going to enjoy advantages, like economies of scale, that
lend themselves to having a strong industry in large, capital-
intensive goods like aerospace."3 5 The point is that the
involvement of non-economic but real world concerns,
such as national prestige, should not result in automatic ex-
emption from the GATT.
Third, the passage of safe harbor exclusions for certain
subsidies strains the doctrinal underpinnings of the GATT.
The GATT is supposed to reduce artificial trade barriers.
These safe harbors for research and development, environ-
mental adjustment, and regional development are subsi-
dies, otherwise known as trade barriers, or elements of
industrial policy. Regardless of the semantics, these provi-
sions signal an implicit movement away from the free mar-
ket principles of the GATT to a more managed atmosphere.
The United States may soon embrace a new trade para-
digm, one requiring fundamental restructuring of certain
parts of our economy.
Fourth, the United States must recognize the hypocrisy in
its belief that the defense budget is not a form of industrial
policy. Hopefully, this will receive full and frank discussion
during the congressional implementation debate. The Jan-
uary 1994 declaration by forty-four Senate Republicans that
they would oppose GATT implementation because it pro-
motes industrial policy may force the United States to come
to terms with its position on government-industry partner-
ships. In fact, this process has already begun. United States
Deputy Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa recently advised
Congress not to be concerned that the new greenlighted
subsidies would allow other countries an edge over the
- Economists Say Industry's GATT Grumbles Prove Process Is Working, supra note 124,
at 426.
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United States because the United States already provides
more research and development programs than any other
country. 136 It is no coincidence that the aircraft industry,
the industry that benefited the most from the cold war de-
fense budgets, is one of the first to call for explicit recogni-
tion of the need for a new industrial policy.
While industrial policy runs counter to the original
GATT mandate, it may be the most effective means to ad-
vance national policy after the cold war. It is difficult to
imagine that the United States or any other power could
ever commit the kind of resources to industry that have
been committed to defense. Nonetheless, the most
profound result of the negotiations may be what is not rec-
ognized in the agreement: an implicit turning away from
the original GATT mission. If industrial policy becomes
widely accepted, then what is the place of GATT negotia-
tions in a spiral of increasing government support to
industry?
Finally, we must ask whether the GATT is a forum that
may prove effective in the future. Future negotiations may
make the debate over subsidies appear to be a mere play-
ground squabble, as the GATT expands to include more
sensitive topics such as workers' rights and environmental
concerns. These will bring new constituencies into the ne-
gotiations and redefine traditional country alignments and
interest group positions. It seems that perhaps the GATT is
moving away from its economic mission toward a more so-
cial orientation. As this occurs, we must remember to ask
ourselves whether it is wise to risk world recession, one po-
tential result of a failed GATT negotiation, in order to moti-
vate agreement on such subjective goals.
156 R&D Provisions of New Subsidies Code Won't Be Used as Loopholes, Yerxa Says, Ir'L
TRADE DAILY, Apr. 22, 1994, at D3.
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